1. C.P. v. DOE 1, ET AL., 22CV1120

Motion to Compel Compliance with Document Production Response

On July 10, 2026, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.320, defendant County of El Dorado ("defendant") filed a motion to compel plaintiff C.P.'s ("plaintiff") compliance with Request for Production ("RFP") Number 17, included in defendant's RFP (Set Two) propounded upon plaintiff. Plaintiff allegedly indicated in his discovery response that he would produce documents in his possession responsive to RFP Number 17 but, to date, he has not done so. Defendant's motion also includes a request for a monetary sanction in the amount of $1,090.50.

On August 4, 2026, plaintiff filed an untimely opposition; the deadline was August 3, 2026. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) Attached thereto is a declaration of plaintiff's attorney, Ryan Jones.

On August 7, 2026, defendant filed a timely reply, as well as evidentiary objections to the declaration of Ryan Jones.

1. Background

RFP Number 17 calls for all writings plaintiff referred to at deposition when asked whether he ever kept a diary or journal. Plaintiff allegedly testified that he had kept a diary or journal and believed it still existed. (Jones Decl., ¶ 2.)

On August 4, 2026, plaintiff served an amended response to RFP, Set Two. (Little Decl., filed Aug. 7, 2026, ¶ 6.) A copy of the amended response was not submitted in connection to this motion. However, plaintiff's opposition brief states that plaintiff's amended response to RFP Number 17 indicates, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230, that plaintiff is unable to comply with the request because the responsive documents have never existed, have been destroyed, have been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or have never been, or are no longer in the possession, custody or control of plaintiff.

2. Evidentiary Objections

Defendant filed seven objections. The court sustains Objection Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. The court overrules Objection Number 7.

3. Discussion

Based on plaintiff's amended response to RFP Set Two, the court denies defendant's motion to compel compliance as moot.

The court, however, finds it appropriate to impose a monetary sanction against plaintiff and plaintiff's attorney, jointly and severally. As defendant points out, plaintiff did not attempt to search for the journal or diary at issue until after defendant filed the instant motion to compel. Having read and considered the declarations from defense counsel, the court finds that $742.50 is an appropriate amount under the Civil Discovery Act, representing 2.7 hours of legal work at $275 per hour. (Little Decl., filed Jul. 10, 2026, ¶ 11.)

TENTATIVE RULING # 1: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE IS DENIED AS MOOT. HOWEVER, THE COURT IMPOSES A MONETARY SANCTION AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY. PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEY OF RECORD SHALL PAY DEFENDANT COUNTY OF EL DORARDO A MONETARY SANCTION OF $742.50 NO LATER THAN SEPTEMBER 18, 2026.

NO HEARING ON THIS MATTER WILL BE HELD (*LEWIS v. SUPERIOR COURT* (1999) 19 CAL.4TH 1232, 1247), UNLESS A NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAR AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT IS TRANSMITTED ELECTRONICALLY THROUGH THE COURT'S WEBSITE OR BY TELEPHONE TO THE COURT AT (530) 573-3042 BY 4:00 P.M. ON THE DAY THE TENTATIVE RULING IS ISSUED. NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES OF AN INTENT TO APPEAR MUST BE MADE BY TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON. PROOF OF SERVICE OF SAID NOTICE MUST BE MADE BY TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON. PROOF OF SERVICE OF SAID NOTICE MUST BE FILED PRIOR TO OR AT THE HEARING.

2. KIRKLAND v. MARRIOTT INTERNAT., INC., 24CV1114

OSC Re: Dismissal after Notice of Settlement

On February 2, 2026, plaintiff filed a notice of settlement of entire case, indicating that a request for dismissal would be filed no later than July 30, 2026. To date, there is no request for dismissal in the court's file.

TENTATIVE RULING # 2: APPEARANCES ARE REQUIRED AT 1:30 P.M., FRIDAY, AUGUST 14, 2026, IN DEPARTMENT FOUR.

3. STEPHENS v. LAUB LAW PLCC, ET AL., 25CV1050

Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Order Setting Aside Default

On May 15, 2026, the court granted defendant Law Firm of Laub & Laub's ("defendant") motion to set aside default. On June 9, 2026, plaintiff Jon C. Stephens ("plaintiff") filed the instant motion to vacate said order.

On August 11, 2026, defendant filed an untimely opposition, as well as a motion to continue the instant hearing, claiming plaintiff's motion did not include a proof of service.

On August 12, 2026, plaintiff filed an opposition to defendant's motion to continue.

The court finds that defendant's argument in support of its motion to continue is unpersuasive. Proof of service filed June 15, 2026, shows plaintiff personally served the motion upon defendant on June 11, 2026.

Turning to plaintiff's motion to vacate, plaintiff claims defendant lacked capacity to file its March 4, 2026, motion to set aside default because its legal status as a professional corporation has been suspended or forfeited since 2015.[1] Notably, plaintiff's third amended complaint ("TAC") names "Law Firm of Laub & Laub, a Professional Corporation (Entity No. 2642007), Suspended California Foreign Corporation." This shows plaintiff was aware of the fact that the professional corporation was allegedly suspended at the time plaintiff filed his TAC.

Although not expressly cited by plaintiff, Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) authorizes the court, upon motion, to "set aside any void judgment or order." (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d).)

In its March 4, 2026, motion to set aside, defendant identified itself as "Law Firm of Laub & Laub." Defendant's proposed answer, attached to the March 4, 2026, motion to set aside, does not clearly state that defendant was erroneously sued under a

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[1] Specifically, the California Secretary of State's website indicates that the Law Firm of Laub & Laub, PC, is a forfeited entity. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).)

misnomer.[2] However, that is the implication where defendant identified itself as "Law Firm of Laub & Laub." Defendant has not identified itself to the court as a corporation and the name it has used to appear in this case does not include the term, "corporation." A business is not required to operate under a corporate legal status. (See, Civ. Code, § 1798.140, subd. (d).)

Based on the above, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the court's May 15, 2026, order is void on the basis of defendant having a suspended or forfeited corporate legal status.

TENTATIVE RULING # 3: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CONTINUE THE INSTANT HEARING IS DENIED. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO VACATE THE COURT'S MAY 15, 2026, ORDER SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT IS DENIED. THE COURT, ON ITS OWN MOTION, ORDERS DEFENDANT LAW FIRM OF LAUB & LAUB TO FILE AND SERVE A NOTICE OF MISNOMER NO LATER THAN SEPTEMBER 4, 2026. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT ORDERS DEFENDANT LAW FIRM OF LAUB & LAUB TO FILE AND SERVE A DECLARATION IDENTIFYING ITS CORRECT ENTITY NAME AND CORPORATE LEGAL STATUS NO LATER THAN SEPTEMBER 4, 2026.

NO HEARING ON THIS MATTER WILL BE HELD (*LEWIS v. SUPERIOR COURT* (1999) 19 CAL.4TH 1232, 1247), UNLESS A NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAR AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT IS TRANSMITTED ELECTRONICALLY THROUGH THE COURT'S WEBSITE OR BY TELEPHONE TO THE COURT AT (530) 573-3042 BY 4:00 P.M. ON THE DAY THE TENTATIVE RULING IS ISSUED. NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES OF AN INTENT TO APPEAR MUST BE MADE BY TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON. PROOF OF SERVICE OF SAID

[2] In fact, the body of the answer does not reference defendant. The body of the answer only references co-defendant Joe Laub. The caption of the proposed answer, as well as the signature line of the proposed answer, however, both reference defendant "Law Firm of Laub & Laub."

NOTICE MUST BE MADE BY TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON. PROOF OF SERVICE OF SAID NOTICE MUST BE FILED PRIOR TO OR AT THE HEARING.

4. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. v. RINGENBERG, 26CV0100

Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Judgment and Dismiss Action Without Prejudice

TENTATIVE RULING # 4: THE MOTION IS GRANTED. THE COURT HEREBY VACATES DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST DEFENDANT ON APRIL 30, 2026, AND DISMISSES PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

NO HEARING ON THIS MATTER WILL BE HELD (*LEWIS v. SUPERIOR COURT* (1999) 19 CAL.4TH 1232, 1247), UNLESS A NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAR AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT IS TRANSMITTED ELECTRONICALLY THROUGH THE COURT'S WEBSITE OR BY TELEPHONE TO THE COURT AT (530) 573-3042 BY 4:00 P.M. ON THE DAY THE TENTATIVE RULING IS ISSUED. NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES OF AN INTENT TO APPEAR MUST BE MADE BY TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON. PROOF OF SERVICE OF SAID NOTICE MUST BE MADE BY TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON. PROOF OF SERVICE OF SAID NOTICE MUST BE FILED PRIOR TO OR AT THE HEARING.

5. MILLER v. HAEN CONSTRUCTORS, ET AL., 25CV2697

(A) Motion for Attorney Withdrawal

(B) Motion to Continue Hearing on Attorney Withdrawal

On July 2, 2026, plaintiff's attorney, R. Parker White, filed a motion to be relieved as counsel.

On August 11, 2026, plaintiff filed an untimely response, which the court has read and considered. Plaintiff concurrently filed a motion to continue the instant hearing to allow her additional time to retain a different attorney.

The court grants counsel's motion to withdraw from the case. Therefore, plaintiff's motion to continue the hearing is denied as moot. The court, on its own motion, will continue the Case Management Conference (currently set for September 8, 2026) to October 20, 2026, to allow plaintiff additional time to retain another attorney.

TENTATIVE RULING # 5:

(A) PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW IS GRANTED. COUNSEL'S WITHDRAWAL WILL BE EFFECTIVE AS OF THE DATE OF FILING PROOF OF SERVICE OF THE FORMAL, SIGNED ORDER UPON THE CLIENT.

(B) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONTINUE THE INSTANT HEARING IS DENIED AS MOOT.

(C) THE COURT, ON ITS OWN MOTION, CONTINUES THE CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE (CURRENTLY SET FOR SEPTEMBER 8, 2026) TO 11:30 A.M., TUESDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2026, IN DEPARTMENT 12.

NO HEARING ON THIS MATTER WILL BE HELD (*LEWIS v. SUPERIOR COURT* (1999) 19 CAL.4TH 1232, 1247), UNLESS A NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAR AND REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT IS TRANSMITTED ELECTRONICALLY THROUGH THE COURT'S WEBSITE OR BY TELEPHONE TO THE COURT AT (530) 573-3042 BY 4:00 P.M. ON THE DAY THE TENTATIVE RULING IS ISSUED. NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES OF AN INTENT TO APPEAR

MUST BE MADE BY TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON. PROOF OF SERVICE OF SAID NOTICE MUST BE FILED PRIOR TO OR AT THE HEARING.

6. BAILEY v. COUNTY OF EL DORADO, 24CV1675

Oral Argument Re: Defendant's Demurrer

TENTATIVE RULING # 6: APPEARANCES ARE REQUIRED AT 1:30 P.M., FRIDAY, AUGUST 14, 2026, IN DEPARTMENT FOUR.

7. JONES, ET AL. v. BRISCOMBE, ET AL., 26CV1001

Petition to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings

On June 15, 2026, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.2 and 1281.4, defendants Sean Briscombe and Sean Briscombe, LLC (collectively, "defendants") filed a petition to compel arbitration and stay litigation. On August 3, 2026, plaintiffs Matthew Jones and Christina Tomolillo (collectively, "plaintiffs") filed evidentiary objections and an opposition brief. Defendants filed no reply.

1. Background

Plaintiffs are both California residents. Their complaint alleges that defendant Sean Briscombe resides in Texas and defendant Sean Briscombe, LLC is a Texas limited liability company with its principal place of business in Texas. (Compl., ¶¶ 6, 7.)

On September 3, 2024, plaintiff Matthew Jones signed an agreement to retain defendant Sean Briscombe, LLC to perform various accounting, trust, and tax matters. (Petn., Ex. A.)

Section 9 of the Agreement includes a Texas choice-of-law provision and Section 10 of the Agreement includes an arbitration provision. Section 10 provides in pertinent part: "All disputes arising out of an related to this Agreement … shall be resolved exclusively by arbitration initiated and conducted in Austin, Texas, by and in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association."

Plaintiff Tomolillo is not a party to Agreement and is not referenced therein. However, the complaint alleges that Ms. Tomolillo was an intended beneficiary of the services provided by defendant Sean Briscombe, LLC and she sues said defendant on that basis.

On April 3, 2026, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants, asserting causes of action for: (1) violation of Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.); (2) fraud and intentional misrepresentation; (3) breach of contract; (4) breach of fiduciary duty; (5) restitution; (6) conversion; and (7) declaratory relief.

2. Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiffs filed two objections. The court sustains Objection Number 1. The court also sustains Objection Number 2 with respect to the term "timely."

3. Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiffs request the court to take judicial notice of two documents, Exhibit A (unrecorded property records) and Exhibit B (a recorded quitclaim deed). Neither exhibit is attached to the request for judicial notice. The court denies the request on this ground. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.115.) Even if plaintiffs had attached copies of the proposed material to the request, it appears to the court that the exhibits are not necessary, helpful, or relevant to the dispute raised by the instant petition. (*Jordache Enterprises*, *Inc. v. Brobeck*, *Phleger & Harrison* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 748, fn. 6.)

4. Discussion

As an initial matter, defendant claims that the issue of arbitrability of the matter is an issue for the arbitrator and not this court. Alternatively, defendant argues that the Agreement is valid and enforceable, and covers the dispute raised in plaintiffs' complaint. Further, defendant argues that, as a third-party beneficiary to the Agreement, plaintiff Tomolillo must be compelled to arbitrate her claims.

Plaintiff opposes the petition on the following grounds: (1) this court should decide arbitrability because the Agreement does not clearly and unmistakably delegate such responsibility to the arbitrator; (2) the Agreement is unenforceable because it is procedurally and substantively unconscionable; (3) defendant Sean Briscombe, as an individual, is not a party to the Agreement and thus, does not have the right to compel arbitration; and (4) plaintiff Tomolillo is not a signatory to the Agreement and cannot be compelled to arbitrate.

4.1. Applicable Law

Both state and federal law have statutory schemes for the enforcement of arbitration agreements. The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") (9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.)

"governs agreements in contracts involving interstate commerce .... [Citations.]" (*Cable Connection*, *Inc. v. DIRECTV*, *Inc.* (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1351 (*Cable Connection*).) The FAA has both substantive and procedural provisions. (*Avila v. Southern Cal. Specialty Care*, *Inc.* (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 835, 840.) Section 2 of the FAA provides in part that "[a] written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract ...." (9 U.S.C. § 2.) This statute, "declaring the enforceability of arbitration agreements, 'create[s] a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.' [Citation.]" (*Cable Connection*, *supra*, at pp. 1350–1351.)

However, in general, the FAA's procedural provisions apply only in federal court, not in state court. (*Cable Connection*, *supra*, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1351; *Victrola 89*, *LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC* (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 345 (*Victrola*).) In state court, the procedural rules of the California Arbitration Act ("CAA") "apply by default to cases brought in California courts, including those in which the FAA governs the arbitrability of the controversy." (*Quach v. Cal. Commerce Club*, *Inc.* (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, 582 (*Quach*).) Nevertheless, "the FAA's procedural rules may apply if the parties expressly agree they do ...." (*Ibid.*; accord, *Cronus Investments*, *Inc. v. Concierge Services* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 394 (*Cronus*).)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 is part of the CAA. (*Cronus*, *supra*, 35 Cal.4th at p. 387.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2[3] addresses the " 'situation that arises

[3] Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 states in part: "On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: [¶] ... [¶] (c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or

when a controversy' " is covered by an arbitration agreement but " 'also affects claims by or against other parties not bound by the arbitration agreement.' " (*Cronus*, *supra*, at p. 393.)

Critically, Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 gives the trial court "the discretion to, among other things, stay or deny arbitration if one or more parties to the action is not subject to arbitration, and multiple proceedings might result in conflicting rulings involving the same transaction. [Citation.]" (*Gravillis v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co.* (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 761, 783.)

In contrast, the FAA "does not authorize courts ... to refuse to enforce a valid arbitration provision to avoid duplicative proceedings or conflicting rulings. [Citation.]" (*Mastick v. TD Ameritrade*, *Inc.* (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1263; accord, *Valencia v. Smyth* (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 156–157 (*Valencia*).) Instead, the FAA requires arbitration to proceed on all claims within the scope of the arbitration agreement.[4] (*Valencia*, *supra*, at p. 157.) In other words, "deciding related disputes in different forums occurs because the FAA 'requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement.' [Citation.]" (*Mastick*, *supra*, at p. 1263.)

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series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact." (*Id.*, subd. (c).) Section 1281.2 further states: "If the court determines that a party to the arbitration is also a party to litigation in a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party as set forth under subdivision (c), the court (1) may refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement and may order intervention or joinder of all parties in a single action or special proceeding; (2) may order intervention or joinder as to all or only certain issues; (3) may order arbitration among the parties who have agreed to arbitration and stay the pending court action or special proceeding pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding; or (4) may stay arbitration pending the outcome of the court action or special proceeding." (*Id.*, last par.)

[4] The distinction is significant in this case where plaintiffs oppose the petition, in part, on the grounds that there may be conflicting rulings if the court orders some, but not all parties to arbitrate (i.e., Sean Briscombe and Christina Tomolillo, both of whom plaintiffs claim are not parties to the Agreement and cannot enforce the Agreement and/or be compelled to arbitrate under the Agreement).

"In accordance with choice-of-law principles, the parties may limit the trial court's authority to ... deny arbitration under the CAA by adopting the more restrictive procedural provisions of the FAA." (*Valencia*, *supra*, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 157; accord, *Victrola*, *supra*, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 346.) For example, in *Victrola*, the arbitration provision stated, " 'Enforcement of this agreement to arbitrate shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act....' " (*Id.* at p. 343, boldface omitted.) The appellate court determined that "when an agreement provides that its 'enforcement' shall be governed by the FAA, the FAA governs a party's motion to compel arbitration." (*Id.* at p. 346.) The appellate court concluded that because "the parties incorporated the procedural provisions of the FAA into the [a]greement," the trial "court could not look to [s]ection 1281.2(c) to deny the" motion to compel arbitration. (*Id.* at pp. 342-343.)

Here, there is no mention of the FAA in the Agreement. Therefore, the court easily concludes that the FAA does not apply.

Absent a choice-of-law provision expressly mandating the application of the procedural law of another jurisdiction, the provisional provisions of the CAA apply by default. (*Royal Alliance Associates, Inc. v. Liebhaber* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1104, fn. 4.) In this case, the Agreement provides that the terms of the Agreement "shall be governed and construed in accordance with the internal law of the state of Texas applicable to contracts made and to be wholly performed therein, without giving effect to Texas's principles of choice of law and conflicts of law." (Petn., Ex. A at ¶ 9 ["Choice of Law"].)

Defendant does not expressly address this issue but appears to take the position that the CAA applies. (See, Petn., at 6:12 ["That is all the California Arbitration Act requires at this stage."].) Plaintiffs do not address the issue, either.

For purposes of deciding the instant petition to arbitrate, the court needs additional briefing from the parties to determine whether the Texas choice-of-law provision in the Agreement results in the displacement of the CAA procedural rules.

TENTATIVE RULING # 7: THE COURT, ON ITS OWN MOTION, CONTINUES THE HEARING TO 1:30 P.M., FRIDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2026, IN DEPARTMENT FOUR AND DIRECTS THE PARTIES TO SUBMIT SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE TEXAS CHOICE-OF-LAW PROVISION IN THE ARBTIRATION AGREEMENT DISPLACES THE PROCEDURAL RULES OF THE CALIFORNIA ARBITRATION ACT FOR THE PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THIS PETIITON. SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFS SHALL BE FILED AND SERVED NO LATER THAN OCTOBER 6, 2026.

8. MATTER OF SMITH, 26CV0876

OSC Re: Name Change

This matter was continued from June 5 and July 17, 2026, because there was no proof of publication or CLETS report in the court's file. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1277, subd. (a)(2)(A), 1279.5, subd. (f).) To date, these documents are still not in the court's file.

Petitioner did not appear at either of the two hearings even though appearances were required both times. Following the June 5 hearing, the court mailed a copy of the minute order to petitioner's address on file but it was returned to the court as undeliverable. Following the July 17 hearing, the court emailed a copy of the minute order to petitioner's email address on file.

TENTATIVE RULING # 8: APPEARANCES ARE REQUIRED AT 1:30 P.M., FRIDAY, AUGUST 14, 2026, IN DEPARTMENT FOUR.

9. MATTER OF ROSE, 26CV1667

OSC Re: Name Change

TENTATIVE RULING # 9: PETITION GRANTED AS REQUESTED.

10. MATTER OF BREZINSKI-SUAREZ, 26CV1721

OSC Re: Name Change

Petitioner Alexander Rachel Brezinski-Suarez petitions to change the name of the following persons: (1) petitioner; (2) petitioner's spouse, Florencia Marin Brezinski-Suarez; and (3) their minor child (age 9 months).

To date, there is no proof of service and no proof of publication in the court's file. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1277, subds. (a)(2)(A), (a)(4).) There is also no written consent from Florencia Marin Brezinski-Suarez regarding the proposed name change of the minor child. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1277, subd. (a)(4).)

TENTATIVE RULING # 10: APPEARANCES ARE REQUIRED AT 1:30 P.M., FRIDAY, AUGUST 14, 2026, IN DEPARTMENT FOUR.

11. TIGRE HOLDINGS LLC, ET AL. v. EL DORADO COUNTY, 25CV3425

Status Conference

TENTATIVE RULING # 11: APPEARANCES ARE REQUIRED AT 1:30 P.M., FRIDAY, AUGUST 14, 2026, IN DEPARTMENT FOUR.